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The interaction effects of CEO power, social connections and 
incentive compensation on firm value 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the relation between company value and the interplay between CEO power, CEO equity 
incentives and the friendliness of the board of directors.  Following Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer 
(2011), we measure CEO power as the proportion paid to the CEO of the total compensation paid 
to the top five executives of the firm.  We find that strong CEO equity incentives and the presence 
of a friendly board of directors both individually moderate the negative effect of CEO power on 
Tobin’s q.  Moreover, these variables also work together.  We find that firm value tends to increase 
when equity incentives are combined with a friendly board.  We conclude that the negative effects 
of CEO power on firm value are limited to firms with weak CEO equity incentive compensation 
plans and arms-length boards of directors. 
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The interaction effects of CEO power, social connections and 
incentive compensation on firm value 
 
 
We study company value at the intersection of CEO power, board friendliness, and CEO 
incentive compensation.  Using the CEO pay slice (CPS) to measure CEO power, Bebchuk, 
Cremers and Peyer (2011) show that powerful CEOs are associated with lower company value.  
This finding is consistent with their view that powerful CEOs use their influence over the board 
of directors to reduce the board’s monitoring effectiveness, allowing the CEO to extract rents from 
shareholders.  Westphal (1999) points out, however, that directors are not merely monitors of 
managerial behavior, but that they have the equally important role of using their combined 
experience and expertise to effectively advise management.  These two roles, monitoring and 
counsel, can be at odds with each other.  Strong monitoring requires an arms-length relationship 
between the board and the CEO, while effective advice and counsel is more collaborative and 
social.  Adams and Ferreira (2007), model this tension between the board’s monitoring and 
advising roles using information sharing between the CEO and board as the key decision element.  
CEOs are reluctant to share information with an arms-length or adversarial board, while full 
information is precisely what the board needs to provide effective advice.  In Adams and Ferreira’s 
model, shareholders benefit from a friendly, collaborative relationship between the CEO and the 
board as long as the value of better advice, derived from more complete information sharing, is 
greater than the value lost through economic rents extracted by the CEO due to weaker monitoring.  
Finally, Westphal (1999) argues that through well-structured CEO incentive compensation plans, 
companies can enjoy enhanced value inherent in effective board advising while mitigating value 
losses due to weaker board monitoring.  We hypothesize that friendly boards can increase value 
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through enhanced advice and counsel when the cost of weaker monitoring is mitigated through 
strong CEO equity incentive compensation. 
We find that the presence of a friendly board of directors and strong CEO equity incentive 
compensation each individually moderate the negative effect of CEO power on firm value reported 
by Bebchuk et al. (2011).  These two characteristics also work together.  We find that firm value 
increases when equity incentives are combined with a friendly board.  We conclude that the 
negative effects of CEO power on firm value are confined mainly to firms with weak CEO equity 
incentive compensation plans.  Due to the dominance of agency theory, the monitoring function 
of the board of directors has received most of the attention from finance scholars.  The board’s 
advising and consultation function, while more fully explored in the management literature, is less 
well developed in the finance literature.  We are the first to study the combined effects of board 
friendliness and incentive equity compensation on the interplay between CEO power and company 
value.   
In Section I, we review the related literature and further develop our hypotheses. We 
explain the methodology for testing our hypotheses in Section II. Section III contains a discussion 
of our sample selection and provides a brief description of our sample. We present and discuss the 
results in Section IV. Section V presents a summary of the paper and our conclusions. 
I. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
a. CEO power and board monitoring 
Increasingly, “outsized” CEO compensation is increasingly becoming an important topic 
in academia, the popular press, and importantly, in government.  For example, Howell (2013) 
writes that when CEO compensation becomes too high, “in some cases reaching 500 times (that) 
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of the average worker”, CEOs and business in general lose the respect of the public.  The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act includes a political response to perceived 
“outsized” CEO compensation which requires shareholder advisory votes on executive pay.  These 
rules were adopted by the SEC in 2011 (SEC (2011)).  In advocating for increased shareholder say 
in the compensation of their firms’ executives, Bebchuk and Fried (2006) argue that CEO pay is 
largely insensitive to performance, and that current corporate governance processes give managers 
undue power over their own pay levels and structure.  Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011) 
examine a new measure of this CEO power directly, the CPS, which is defined as the proportion 
of combined total compensation of the top five executives earned by the CEO alone.  Although 
computed using compensation data, Bebchuk et al. (2011) present the CPS as a measure of the 
board’s perception of the importance or power of the CEO rather than a measure of his 
compensation.  In this framework, the CEO may be important to the firm due to the firm’s need 
for a talented, decisive leader, in which case a high CPS may indicate a high-value, strategic leader.  
Or the CEO may be important in the firm due to his power and influence over the board and the 
firm’s other executives, in which case a high CPS may indicate a low-value, entrenched manager.  
Consistent with the latter, Bebchuk et al. (2011) show a significantly negative average relation 
between CPS and industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, which they attribute to the agency problem of a 
powerful CEO extracting rents from a captured board to the detriment of shareholders.  Using 
these results, the authors argue for stronger, more independent boards of directors and more direct 
shareholder control, both of which are intended to more closely monitor management. 
According to the Corporate Director’s Guidebook (2011), however, corporate directors 
“have a responsibility to act in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders” and they 
“fulfill this responsibility through two primary board functions: decision-making and oversight” 
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(see section 3).  In general, the oversight function involves monitoring the company’s management 
and performance, while the decision-making function involves familiarity with and approval of 
corporate policy and strategy.  These dual roles can be contradictory.  Unbiased monitoring implies 
that directors maintain an arms-length, outsider-dominated relationship with the company’s 
management (CEO).  The monitoring capabilities of directors who are too dependent on or too 
friendly with the CEO may be compromised by this relationship (Bebchuk and Fried (2006)) 
leading to a captured board and consequential value decreases.  Providing valuable advice and 
counsel on policy and strategy, on the other hand, requires trust between the CEO and the board 
for two closely related reasons.  First, in order to provide timely, actionable advice the board 
depends on the CEO to reveal all pertinent information.  Such information could potentially portray 
the CEO in a negative light.  Ultimately, the CEO will only disclose full information when he 
trusts the board to use this information to benefit the company rather than to simply attack him 
(see Holmstrom (2005)).  Without such trust, an arms-length, outsider-dominated board may not 
receive full information until it is released publicly or at time of crisis.  And second, in order for 
the board to provide effective advice the CEO must reveal the need for and then accept and 
implement the recommendations of the board.  CEO reluctance to disclose pertinent information 
to the board, or to ask for and then accept the board’s recommendations limits the quality and 
usefulness of board advice.  Adams and Ferreira (2007) model this tension between the monitoring 
and advisory roles of the board.  In their model, both the value of the board’s advice and the 
intensity of its monitoring increase as the CEO reveals more information.  The increase in advice 
benefits both the firm and the CEO as firm performance increases, but increased monitoring 
intensity is personally detrimental to the CEO.  The conclusion from the model is that shareholders 
benefit from a more friendly board when the marginal loss from reduced monitoring is less than 
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the marginal gain obtained when the CEO more freely shares information with and thereby obtains 
better advice and counsel from a CEO-friendly board.  We test the deleterious effect of CEO power 
on company value. 
 
b. Friendly boards 
Many prior studies examine the effects of friendly boards of directors.  Many of those 
define board structure as the proportion of inside versus outside directors.  Insiders are defined as 
directors who are also employees or former employees of the company, each of whom may be 
expressly dependent on the CEO.  Outsiders include both directors who are fully independent of 
the firm, and gray directors whose outsider status is unclear.  This latter group includes directors 
with business ties to the company and relatives of company officers.  In this context, objectively 
defining a friendly board capable of providing valuable and timely advice, and in whom the CEO 
is willing to divulge full information, is difficult.  Board insiders who are current employees are 
obviously subordinate to the CEO, which implies both a lower level of experience and a possible 
reluctance to “challenge the boss.”  Board insiders may also include the former CEO, who may 
have the experience to provide advice, but may be reluctant to interfere with the new CEO or 
whose interference the new CEO may resent.  Board outsiders are assumed to be arms-length 
monitors, and are therefore not friendly by definition.  Using a relatively new database, we redefine 
board structure to include directors who are “friendly” with and those who are “not friendly” with 
the CEO.  Boardex, developed by Management Diagnostics Ltd., contains biographical 
information on directors and senior executives throughout the world (see corp.boardex.com).  The 
biographical data contained in the BoardEx database includes educational details such as school, 
degree earned and graduation date; employment history; current employment details including 
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board memberships in other companies; and other social activities.  Using this comprehensive 
database, we define a friendly director as an individual who has a high probability of actually being 
a friend of the CEO.  Specifically, either the two individuals went to school together, worked 
together in the past, currently serve on a third company’s board, or serve together as active officers 
or board members of a social club, philanthropic organization, athletic club, or other civic 
organization.  With this history of being prominent in each other’s social networks, it is likely that 
the CEO and the socially connected director know and trust each other.  According to a pure form 
of agency theory, this situation would result in an entrenched manager who takes advantage of or 
colludes with such friendly directors in order to extract rents from stockholders.  In the presence 
of strong equity incentive compensation, which may mitigate such agency problems, a well-
motivated manager combined with a friendly, collaborative board of directors may be better 
equipped to maximize company value. 
The question of trust has been examined in the management and sociology literature.  Uzzi 
(1996) uses field research of apparel firms in New York’s garment district to guide his 
development of a theory of trust and embeddedness.  As defined by Uzzi, embeddedness is “the 
process by which social relations shape economic action.”  The effect of social relations is largely 
ignored by the economic logic of market exchange between arms-length, atomistic players.  Uzzi 
finds embeddedness has “three features: trust, fine-grained information transfer, and joint problem-
solving.”  Becoming embedded in the network implies having developed trust with network 
members through a series of mutual, non-obligatory, nonmarket exchanges.  After having 
developed trust with the members of the network through these exchanges, trust becomes the 
governing mechanism through which behavioral expectations are formed and ultimately judged.  
Fine-grained information shared with network members is, according to Uzzi, detailed and 
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strategic, and increases the effectiveness and responsiveness of network members.  Sharing this 
proprietary information requires absolute trust that the information will not be misused, while 
using the information requires trust in its accuracy.  Joint problem-solving allows network 
members to coordinate actions and work out problems “on the fly” providing quicker and more 
direct feedback than can arms-length, contract-based relationships. Relating these findings to the 
context of corporate boards, it would be difficult for an outsider-dominated board to develop 
enough trust to induce the CEO to provide the fine-grained information the board needs to provide 
effective advice and consultation on policy and strategy (i.e., on-the-fly problem solving).  This is 
where having a friendly director can facilitate trust-building between the CEO and the board, 
particularly if the board believes the CEO has strong alignment of incentives with shareholders.  
Westphal (1999) finds that higher levels of long-term, equity-based compensation, can enhance 
the connection between CEO-Board social ties and board advice while also reducing the negative 
aspects of weakened monitoring. 
 
c. CEO monitoring through incentive compensation 
Reduced formal board monitoring by a friendly board does not necessarily imply an 
increase in agency problems such as entrenchment and ultimately lower firm value.  Researchers 
have proposed many solutions to a firm’s agency problem including internal control mechanisms 
such as leverage (Jensen (1986)), managerial ownership (Stulz (1988)), and the takeover market 
(Jensen (1986) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell (2009)).  Bebchuk Cremers and Peyer (2011) 
examine each of these mechanisms empirically finding that firm leverage and a given manager’s 
protection from the takeover market have negative effects on firm value measured using industry-
adjusted Tobin’s q, while finding no relation between firm value and managerial ownership.  After 
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accounting for each of these control mechanisms, Bebchuk et al. (2011) report a strong negative 
relation between firm value and CEO power.  Apparently, these three mechanisms are ineffectual 
in controlling the value-destroying agency problem associated with powerful CEOs.   
One often proposed solution to the agency problem not examined by Bebchuk et al. (2011) 
is executive equity incentive compensation.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) measure the sensitivity of 
CEO compensation to changes in share prices and find the average CEO’s wealth increases by 
$3.25 for each $1,000 increase in firm value.  Although this finding is statistically significant, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) conclude that this level of pay-performance sensitivity is not high 
enough to induce incentive alignment with shareholders.  Garen (1994) shows that Jensen and 
Murphy’s conclusion about the level of pay-performance sensitivity holds little meaning due to 
high between-firm variability in measuring pay-performance sensitivity, and develops a principle-
agent model that predicts significant between-firm variability in optimal pay-performance 
sensitivity.  In his model, the variability in optimal pay-performance sensitivity is due to the 
underlying variability of the firm’s profits.  The higher the inherent variability in the firm’s 
business (industry), the lower the optimal level of pay-performance sensitivity in the CEO’s 
compensation contract, and the higher (lower) the salary (equity) component in his contract.  
Garen’s modified model, which includes CEO choice of investment projects, indicates that CEO 
decision making becomes more risk-averse with a high pay-performance compensation contract.  
Garen’s empirical work is consistent with his predictions: higher company variability tends to 
reduce pay-performance sensitivity and increase the salary component implying that pay-
performance sensitivity may be company- or industry-specific.  Using a new empirical 
methodology that explicitly accounts for this heterogeneity in compensation contracts across firms, 
Hermalin and Wallace (2001) find a significant positive relation between pay and performance.  
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Mehran (1995) provides evidence supporting the role of equity incentives in inducing managerial 
performance, reporting that firm performance is positively related to the percentage of 
compensation that is equity-based.  We test the interaction between CEO equity incentive 
compensation, and its implied substitution for strong board monitoring, on the detrimental effects 
of CEO power on company value.  
 
d. Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis relates to CEO power and company value.  A powerful CEO may use 
that power to extract economic rents from the company and thereby reduce company value.  On 
the other hand, a talented, well-motivated CEO intent on adding value to the company she leads 
needs the decision-making authority or power to do so.  Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), our first 
hypothesis posits a negative average relation between CEO power and company value, but we do 
not expect this relation to hold in all cases.  Our other hypotheses are related to the possible 
mitigation of this negative effect of CEO power on company value.  If the board of directors is 
friendly with the CEO, it could imply either an entrenched, value-decreasing relationship or a 
collaborative, value-increasing relationship.  While we do not posit the direction of the relation, in 
null form our second hypothesis states that social connections between the CEO and board of 
directors do not change the negative effect of CEO power on company value.  If the CEO’s 
interests are aligned with those of shareholders through a well-structured equity incentive 
compensation plan, we expect a mitigation of the negative effect of CEO power on company value.  
Therefore, we posit in our third hypothesis that powerful CEOs whose compensation plans contain 
a larger equity component will lead more valuable companies, while powerful CEOs compensated 
more with salary and bonuses will preside over less valuable companies.  That is, when CEO’s 
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incentives are aligned with the interests of shareholders, we expect the negative effect of CEO 
power on company values to be reduced.    Our final hypothesis combines the previous hypotheses:  
when a friendly board of directors relies on a well-structured equity compensation plan for CEO 
monitoring, that this combination will lead to effective CEO-board collaboration, a self-monitored 
CEO, and consequentially higher company values.   
 
II. Empirical Methods 
We study the moderating effects of and interaction between the friendliness of the board of directors 
and CEO equity incentive compensation on the relation between firm value and CEO power.  As noted 
above, following Bebchuk, et al. (2011), we use CPS to measure CEO power and Tobin’s q (Q) to measure 
company value.  CPS is the ratio of total CEO compensation to the combined total compensation of the top 
five executives in the firm, including the CEO.  Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value of assets, defined 
as total book value of assets less both book value of equity and deferred taxes plus market value of equity, 
to the firm’s total book value of assets.  We use the CEO’s fraction of equity compensation (FEC) to 
measure CEO incentive compensation, defined as the fraction of the CEO’s annual incentive equity 
compensation (grants of stock, restricted stock and the Black-Scholes value of option awards) to his total 
annual compensation.  In developing our board friendliness measure, we follow Fracassi and Tate (2012) 
who identify four basic social ties included in Boardex data, (i) current employment (typically external 
directorships in other firms), (ii) overlapping past employment in a previous mutual employer, (iii) 
education (which we define as same school, same graduation year and same degree), and (iv) other activities 
(active membership in clubs, organizations or charities)1  Our primary measure of board friendliness, 
CONNEX, is a dummy variable that equals one when at least one outside director has at least one of the 
four connections listed above.  As a robustness test, we repeat our tests using the ratio of socially connected 
                                                 
1 See Fracassi and Tate (2012) for a more full description of this rich database.  
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directors to total outside directors (CONN (ratio)).  Due to potential endogeneity among these variables, 
we lag all independent variables.  
For control variables, we follow Bebchuk, et al. (2011).  E Index is a measure of corporate 
governance developed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell (2009), which is simply the number of antitakeover 
provisions present in a given company’s charter.2  The greater the E Index, the more protected or entrenched 
is management.  In general, stronger corporate governance implies a lower E Index.  SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  ROA is the ratio of a firm’s operating income before 
depreciation to total assets.  LTD is the ratio of a firm’s long-term debt to total assets.  CFL is a 
firm’s cash flow to assets and equals the ratio of the sum of operating, investing and financing 
cash flow to total assets.  RnD is the ratio of a firm’s research and development expense to sales.  
RnD MISS is a dummy variable that equals one when Compustat reports research and 
development as missing and zero otherwise.  CAPEX equals a firm’s capital expenditures to total 
assets.   
Our empirical methodology is similar to that of Bebchuk, et al. (2011), who run multiple 
OLS regressions with pooled time series and cross-sectional data using various combinations of 
firm and year fixed-effects dummies.  As their measure of firm value, Bebchuk, et al, (2011) 
industry-adjust Tobin’s q in order to control for industry shocks.  Gormley and Matsa (2014) 
criticize industry-adjusting dependent variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity when used 
in regression analysis showing that such methods produce inconsistent estimates and can even 
reverse estimated relations between variables.  Our first regression replicates that of Bebchuk et 
al. (2011), and uses industry-adjusted Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, while all of our 
                                                 
2 Appendix A describes the governance characteristics that are included in the calculation of the entrenchment index.  
The data on governance characteristics are from the IRRC/Risk Metrics Group , Inc. databases.  This data is collected 
by IRRC/Risk Metrics every two or three years.  We use the lagged measure of E index in our analysis to avoid 
forward-looking bias.   
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subsequent regressions follow the suggestion of Gormley and Matsa (2014) using raw, unadjusted 
Tobin’s q, instead.  All regressions use time and industry fixed-effects dummy variables, as 
suggested by Gormley and Matsa (2014), to control for unobserved heterogeneity in time and 
industry.  We do not use firm fixed-effects variables since several of our independent variables 
(e.g., E index and CONNEX) have little within-firm variability over time.   
Our primary tests involve the use of various interaction terms.  For example, we interact 
the dummy variable CONNEX with the continuous variable CPS in order to determine whether 
the negative effect of CEO power on firm value is moderated in the presence of a friendly board 
of directors.  Interaction terms are relatively easy to interpret when one of the variables is 
dichotomous.  In this case, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term CONNEXxCPS, which 
we call the second-order effect, will capture the effect of CPS on Q when the board is friendly, 
while the coefficient on CPS alone will capture the effect of CPS on Q when the board is arms-
length.  The effect of CPS on Q depends on one of only two conditions: whether CONNEX equals 
one or zero.  Interaction terms involving two continuous variables, however, are more difficult to 
interpret because each of the variables can take on an infinite number of possible values, and their 
interaction effects are conditional on a potentially infinite number of values.  Because of this, it is 
advantageous to center the variables.  In addition to improving the interpretation of the resulting 
estimates, centering the continuous variables to be interacted can also reduce the collinearity 
between the interaction variable and the two related independent variables (Afshartous and Preston 
(2011)).  We choose to center our interacted continuous variables at their mean values.  After 
centering the independent variables, interpretation of their estimated coefficients, the first-order or 
non-interaction effects, changes from the effect on Y when other variables equal zero to the effect 
on Y when other centered variables equal their mean values.  Similarly, interpretation of the 
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interaction or second-order effect becomes the effect of one centered independent variable when 
both centered independent variables are at their mean value.  Due to this conditionality, we 
illustrate our results using interaction plots that allow the centered independent variables to vary.  
 
III. Sample Selection and Description 
Our initial sample consists of all firm-years for which data is available from various sources 
over the eleven years from 2000 through 2010.  Our first data filter was availability of executive 
compensation data on Execucomp.  Since we study the impact of various CEO-related factors on 
firm value, we require the CEO to be in office over an entire sample year.  Otherwise, our tests 
may include some data for company performance over which the CEO had little or only partial 
control that year.  Following Bebchuk, et al. (2011), we define the CPS as the proportion of the 
total compensation of the top five executives allocated to the CEO.  Therefore, Execucomp must 
contain compensation data for the top five executives.  Merging Execucomp data with that 
contained within Compustat resulted in a sample containing 22,056 firm-years.  Merging our 
Boardex database into this preliminary sample resulted in 11,514 firm-year observations.  And 
finally, merging with the E index data computed from IRRC/Risk Metrics Goup, data, results in a 
final sample of 7,143 firm-year observations.   
Table I presents various descriptive statistics for our sample. Sample firms have mean 
(median) total assets of around $2.7 billion ($2.3 billion), and mean (median) Tobin’s q of about 
1.8 (1.4).  More interesting, CEO’s garner a large part of total executive pay with a mean (median) 
CPS of 39.5% (39.6%).  Sample CEOs have strong equity incentives with mean (median) CEO 
fraction of equity compensation (FEC) of 43.5% (46.5%).  CONNEX is about 64%, implying that 
social connections between the CEO and board of directors are present in about 64% of our sample 
16 
 
firms.  CONNEX (ratio) indicates that about 19% of the outside directors at the average firm are 
socially connected to the CEO. 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
Table II provides the distribution of social connections through time for our sample.  Each 
row represents a different sample year, and for each year we show the total number of connections 
between the CEO and the board of directors, and the proportions of firms with no connections, one 
connection, two connections and greater than two connections.  The percentages reported in each 
row sum to 100%.  Focusing on the sample totals in the last row, note that about 36% of the sample 
firm-years had zero connections between the CEO and the board, implying that about 64% had at 
least one connection.  Furthermore, 22% had one connection, 12% had two connections, and about 
28% had more than two such connections.   
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
Table III provides a matrix of estimated correlation coefficients for our variables.  Among 
the independent variables, in general SIZE appears to be the variable with the highest correlations 
with other independent variables.   The largest individual correlation coefficients are between Q 
and ROA (59%), capital expenditures and return on assets (46%), and Q and RnD (41%), which 
all seem intuitive.  There is also a significantly positive correlation between SIZE and social 
connections (32%) indicating that larger firms are more likely to have social connections between 
the CEO and board of directors.   
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
 
IV. Results 
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a. Firm value and the CEO pay slice 
We begin our analysis by replicating Bebchuk et al. (2011), the results of which we report 
in the first column of Table IV.  Using the same control variables, and including year and industry 
dummy variables, we find a statistically significant negative relation between CPS and lagged, 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q.  This is consistent with Bebchuk et al.’s (2011) finding that large CPS 
is related to lower industry-adjusted Tobin’s q.  As noted above, Gormley and Matsa (2014) show 
that using industry-adjusted dependent variables in pooled time-series cross-sectional regression 
analyses produces inconsistent coefficients and potentially incorrect inferences.  Gormley and 
Matsa (2014) show that using unadjusted dependent variables instead along with the fixed-effects 
methodology provides consistent estimated coefficients and correct inferences.  Following 
Gormley and Matsa (2014), we re-estimate our Bebchuk et al. (2011) replication using the raw, 
unadjusted Q and year and industry fixed-effects dummy variables.  The column 2 results for 
several of the variables, when contrasted with the industry-adjusted replication results in column 
1, highlight Gormley and Matsa’s (2014) critique.  For the R&D-missing dummy variable, the 
coefficient reverses from a statistically significant (t-statistic=8.06) positive value to a statistically 
significant (t-statistic=-3.20) negative value.  For the size variable, the coefficient reverses from a 
statistically significant (t-statistic=5.04) positive value to a statistically insignificant (t-statistic=-
0.95) negative value.  Most importantly, the estimated coefficient for CPS changes from a 
statistically significant -0.231 (t-statistic=-3.61) to an insignificant -0.054 (t-statistic=-0.85).  This 
result casts doubt on Bebchuk et al. (2011)’s conclusion relating higher levels of CPS with lower 
firm value. 
Despite the statistical insignificance of this result, we hypothesize that CPS can indicate 
the importance of the CEO to the firm (e.g., talent) and consequential relative value increases in 
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some companies, while in others it may signal the importance of the CEO in the firm (e.g., 
entrenchment) and consequential value decreases.  If CEO power is distributed somewhat equally, 
and are pooled together, we might expect to find insignificant results for the full sample as the 
value increases for one group tend to wash out value decreases for the other.  We examine two 
variables, CEO incentive equity compensation and CEO social connections with the board of 
directors, which may help us distinguish between high CPS due to entrenchment from high CPS 
due to talent.  The variable FEC, which as noted above we define as the fraction of a CEO’s total 
annual compensation that comes in the form of incentive equity compensation, measures the 
CEO’s economic incentive to act in the best interests of shareholders.  To the extent that 
compensation can motivate managers in this way, higher FEC will reduce agency costs and lead 
to higher firm value.  The relation between CEO social connections with the board of directors, 
CONNEX, however, is not as clear.  Such social connections could produce a “captured” board 
and thus lead to entrenchment of the CEO, or it could indicate a well-functioning relationship 
between a properly motivated CEO and a friendly board.  We report the relation between each of 
these and firm value in columns 3 and 4 of Table IV.  The estimated coefficient on FEC reported 
in column 3 indicates a positive relation between firm value and incentive alignment (t-
statistic=6.07), which is consistent with the hypothesis that the market recognizes the agency cost-
reductions associated with incentive equity compensation and rewards companies with such 
incentive structures with higher valuations.  The estimated coefficient on CONNEX, however, is 
insignificantly different from zero (t-statistic=0.13) indicating that either CEO social connections 
with the board do not have value implications or that the effect is more complex than presently 
modeled. 
  INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
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b. The interaction effects of incentive equity compensation and social connections. 
Next, we test the interaction effects of incentive equity compensation and social 
connections on firm value.  In Section II above, we posit that strong compensation incentives can 
differentiate between firms with talented, powerful (i.e., high-CPS) CEOs and firms with 
entrenched, powerful CEOs.  Well incentivized CEOs are more likely to be important to the firm 
by using the power indicated by their large pay slice to make full use of all the firm’s resources, 
including the board of directors’ knowledge and experience, to increase firm value.  Column 1 of 
Table V reports the results of interacting FEC with CPS.  Note first the positive relation between 
firm value and FEC indicating positive effects of equity compensation regardless of CEO power.  
The positive estimated coefficient on this interaction term indicates that higher CEO incentive 
compensation coupled with higher CPS tends to increase firm value.  This finding is consistent 
with our hypothesis that powerful CEOs with strong incentive compensation use their power to 
increase firm value.  Importantly, note that once this interaction is accounted for the estimate on 
CPS is significantly negative indicating that the high CPS of CEOs with lower levels of incentive 
compensation tend to be associated with lower firm value, which is consistent with entrenchment 
of powerful but poorly incentivized CEOs.  We illustrate this interaction effect in Figure 1, which 
shows two line-plots indicating the change in Q (vertical axis) as CPS changes from its minimum 
to its maximum value (on the horizontal axis) at two values of FEC (two standard deviations above 
and below its mean).  Note that when the CEO has low incentive equity compensation (downward 
sloping line), there is a negative relation between Q and CPS, but when the CEO has strong equity 
incentives (upwards sloping line) firm value increases with CPS. 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Section II above, we suggest that a friendly board can indicate either a captured board 
and an entrenched CEO who is important in the firm, or a collaborative board and a talented CEO 
who is important to the firm.  If the former is true, our interaction of the social connections dummy 
with CPS should be negative indicating a reduction in firm value when social connections are 
present.  If the latter is true, however, the interaction term should carry a positive estimated 
coefficient as collaboration between a friendly board and the CEO leads to higher firm value.  
Column 2 of Table V reports the results of interacting CONNEX with CPS.  Note first the 
insignificant coefficient on CONNEX indicating no independent relation between firm value and 
social connections between the CEO and board of directors.  The positive estimated coefficient on 
the interaction term, however, is consistent with the hypothesis that when socially connected to 
the board, powerful CEOs tend to use their power in ways that leads to increased firm value.  Note 
again that once the interaction is accounted for the relation between CPS and firm value is negative 
which is consistent with deleterious effects on firm value of powerful CEOs combined with arms-
length boards.  We illustrate this interaction effect in Figure 2, which shows two line plots 
indicating the change in Q (vertical axis) as CPS changes from its minimum to its maximum value 
(along the horizontal axis) when the social connections dummy variable equals either one (with 
social connections and upward sloping line) or zero (without social connections and downward 
sloping line).  Note the striking difference between the slopes of the two lines.  Firm value 
increases with CPS in the presence of a friendly board, while CEO power has a negative effect on 
value with an arms-length board 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Building on Adams and Ferreira (2007), Uzzi (1996), and Westphal (1999), our primary 
hypothesis is that firms with a friendly board and a powerful, well-motivated CEO with a friendly 
board will experience the benefits of a trust relationship between the board and management 
without the agency costs that might normally be associated with weak monitoring.  In these firms 
the powerful CEO feels more comfortable sharing full information with and asking for input from 
the friendly board while potential agency problems are mitigated due to the self-monitoring 
provided by the compensation contract.  Column 3 of Table V reports the results of a regression 
that includes the interaction terms between both CPS and FEC, and CPS and CONNEX. , and 
shows that the estimated coefficients on both interaction terms maintain their significantly positive 
relation to firm value.  This is consistent with our hypothesis that powerful CEOs, when combined 
with a friendly, collaborative board of directors and the self-motivation derived from strong 
incentive equity compensation, add value separately and together to the firms they manage.  Also 
note the continued strong positive relation between firm value and higher equity compensation.  
The estimated coefficient on CPS continues to be strongly negative indicating that firm value tends 
to be lower when managed by powerful CEOs working without the benefits of a friendly board of 
directors and a strong incentive equity compensation plan.   
Our final regression directly tests our hypothesis.  If a well incentivized, self-monitored 
CEO makes use of the power indicated by a high CPS coupled with a collaborative board of 
directors with which he shares full information and from which he obtains effective advice and 
counsel, a third-order interaction term between these three variables would be significantly 
positive.  That is, if equity incentive compensation and social connections between the CEO and 
firm directors together moderate the negative effects associated with a powerful CEO, the 
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estimated coefficient on a third-order interaction term between these three variables should be 
significantly positive.  Column 4 reports the results of this third-order interaction, and are 
consistent with our hypothesis.  If the CEO is connected to the board, firm value increases as both 
the proportion of equity compensation and CPS increase.  We illustrate the results of this third-
order interaction regression in Figure 3, which shows two sets of line plots indicating the change 
in Q (vertical axis) as CPS changes from its minimum to its maximum (horizontal axis), when 
CONNEX equals either one (upward sloping and dark) or zero (downward sloping and red).  The 
dotted lines surrounding each solid line show the range of Q values at each CPS value as FEC is 
varied plus or minus one standard deviation around its mean.  Therefore, the set of three upward 
sloping lines (in dark) represents the effects on Q of a friendly board as CPS changes and FEC is 
varied.  Note the divergence of the dotted lines from the mean.  This indicates that when the board 
is friendly increases in equity incentives continue to add value.  The set of three downward sloping 
lines (in red) represents the effects on Q of an arms-length board as CPS changes and FEC is 
varied.  Note that when the board is arms-length, the negative effect of CPS on Q dominates no 
matter what the equity compensation (red dotted lines are parallel to mean).  In summary, firm 
value increases with increases in CPS and FEC, but only in the presence of a friendly board of 
directors. 
  
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
 
V. Conclusion 
23 
 
 
Using pay slice to indicate CEO power, Bebchuk et al. (2011) show that powerful, 
entrenched, overpaid CEOs are associated with diminished company values.  A high pay slice, 
however, could also indicate a decisive, talented, fairly-compensated CEO.  We develop a model 
that relies on CEO incentive compensation and board friendliness to separate these two CEO types.  
Boards of directors are tasked with seemingly contradictory functions of both monitoring and 
advising management. Effective monitoring implies an arms-length relationship, while effective 
advising requires full disclosure of pertinent information.  Full disclosure, however, requires 
management to trust that directors will use the information to help the company and not to attack 
management.  In our interaction model CEO incentive compensation substitutes strong self-
motivation for strong, arms-length board monitoring, while social connections between 
management and the board produces trust facilitating full information disclosure.    
Our empirical model tests the effects on company value of incentive compensation and 
board friendliness, interacted independently with CEO power, and interacted together with CEO 
power.  Independently, incentive compensation is associated with higher company value, while 
board friendliness is not.  When examined together, powerful CEOs with relatively strong 
incentive compensation increase value, while powerful CEOs with relatively weak incentive 
compensation tend to decrease company value.  Similarly, companies with powerful CEOs and a 
friendly board of directors tend to have higher values than companies with powerful CEOs who 
do not have a social connection with the board.  The estimated coefficient on a third-order 
interaction between incentive compensation, board friendliness and CEO power indicates that 
powerful CEOs with both friendly boards and stronger incentive compensation are associated with 
higher value.  Taken together, these findings are consistent with our model of incentive 
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compensation acting to mitigate the agency costs associated with friendly boards of directors 
allowing those boards to provide effective advice and consultation, in conjunction with full 
information disclosure from the CEO to the board resulting from a higher level of trust, and 
ultimately higher company value. 
 
25 
 
References 
Adams, Renee B., and Daniell Ferreira, 2007, A theory of friendly boards, Journal of Finance 62, 
217-250. 
 
Adams, Renee B., Benjamin E. Hermalin, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2010, The role of boards of 
directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey, Journal of 
Economic Literature 48.1 (2010): 58-107. 
 
Afshartous, David, and, Richard A. Preston, 2011, Key results of interaction models with 
centering, Journal of Statistics Education 19, 1-24.  
 
Bebchuk, Lucian, Jesse M. Fried, 2006, Pay without performance, Academy of Management 
Perspectives 20, 5-24.  
 
Bebchuk, Lucian, K.J. Martijn Cremers and Urs C. Peyer, 2011, The CEO pay slice, Journal of 
Financial Economics 102, 199-221. 
 
Cai, Ye, and Merih Sevilir, 2012, Board connections and M&A transactions, Journal of Financial 
Economics 103, 327-349. 
 
Corporate Director's Guidebook -- Sixth Edition. Business Lawyer, Aug 2011, Vol. 66, Issue 4. 
 
Fracassi, Cesare, 2012, Corporate finance policies and social networks,working paper, University 
of Texas. 
 
Fracassi, Cesare, and Geoffrey Tate, 2012, External networking and internal firm governance, 
Journal of Finance 67, 153-193. 
 
Garen, John E., 1994, Executive compensation and principal-agent theory, Journal of Political 
Economy 102, 1175-1199. 
 
Gormley, Todd A., and David A. Matsa, 2012, Common errors: How to (and not to) control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, Wharton School working paper. 
 
Guthrie, Katherine, Jan Sokolowsky and Kam-Ming Wan, 2012, CEO compensation and board 
structure revisited, Journal of Finance 67, 1149-1168. 
 
Holmstrom, Bengt, 2005, Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A 
Comment, Journal of Corporation Law 30, 703-713. 
 
Howell, Robert, 2013, What could business do to improve the business climate in the U.S.?, Wall 
Street Journal November 29, published online at online.wsj.com. 
 
 Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun, and Seoyoung Kim, 2009, It pays to have friends, Journal of Financial 
Economics 93, 138-158. 
26 
 
 
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305-360. 
 
Jensen, Michael C., and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990, Performance pay and top-management 
incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264. 
 
Kale, Jayant R., Ebru Reis and Anand Venkateswaran, 2009, Rank-order tournaments and 
inventive alignment: The effect on firm performance, Journal of Finance 64, 1479-1512. 
 
Kumar, Praveen, and K. Sivaramakrrishnan, 2008, Who monitors the monitor?  The effect of board 
independence on executive compensation and firm value, Reveiw of Financial Studies 21, 
1371-1401. 
 
Levrau, Abigail, and L. A. A. Van den Berghe. "Corporate governance and Board Effectiveness: 
beyond formalism." ICFAI Journal of Corporate Governance 6.4 (2007): 58-85. 
 
Liu, Yixin, and Pornsit Jiraporn, 2010, The effect of CEO power on bond ratings and yields, 
Journal of Empirical Finance 17, 744-762. 
 
Main, Brian G., Charles A. O'Reilly and James Wade, 1995, The CEO, the board of directors and 
executive compensation: Economic and psychological perspectives, Industrial and 
Corporate Change 4(2), 293-332. 
 
Mande, Vivek, and Myungsoo Son, 2012, CEO centrality and meeting or beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting 39, 82-112. 
 
Mehran, Hamid, 1995, Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance, 
Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184. 
 
Omer, Thomas C., Marjorie K. Shelley and Frances M. Tice, 2012, Do well-connected directors 
improve firm performance?, working paper Texas A&M University. 
 
SEC, 2011, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm 
 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, A Survey of corporate governance, The Journal of 
Finance 52, 737–783. 
 
Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 2008, Social networks and corporate governance, European 
Financial Management 14, 633-662. 
 
Uzzi, Brian, 1996, The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance 
of organizations: The network effect, American Sociological Review 61, 674-698. 
 
White, Halbert, 1980, A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838. 
27 
 
 
Westphal, James D., 1999, Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance 
consequences of CEO-board social ties, Academy of Management Journal 42(1), 7-24. 
 
Westphal, James D., and Edward J. Zajac, 2013, A behavioral theory of corporate governance: 
Explicating the mechanisms of socially situated and socially constituted agency,. The 
Academy of Management Annals 7(1), 605-659. 
  
28 
 
Appendix A 
Components of the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) Entrenchment Index 
 
The index for a company receives a value of 1 for the presence of each of the six listed 
governance characteristics, thereby having a maximum value of 6.   
 
a. Presence of a classified (staggered) board  
b. Presence of limitations to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws 
c. Presence of supermajority voting for business combinations 
d. Presence of supermajority requirements for charter amendments 
e. Presence of golden parachutes for management 
f. Presence of a poison pill 
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Table I.  Sample Summary Statistics 
 
This table contains summary statistics for our sample of 7,143 firm-years from 2000 through 2010.  Q is 
Tobin’s q, which we measure as the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value.  CPS is the CEO 
pay slice, which is defined as the ratio of the CEO’s total compensation to the total compensation of the 
firm’s top five executives, including the CEO, as listed in Execucomp. FEC is the ratio of the CEO’s 
reported equity compensation to the CEO’s total compensation.  E Index is Bebchuk’s entrenchment 
index, available at (http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml).  SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  ROA is the ratio of a firm’s operating income before 
depreciation to total assets.  LTD is the ratio of a firm’s long-term debt to total assets.  CFL is 
a firm’s cash flow to assets and equals the ratio of operating, investing and financing cash flow 
to total assets.  RnD is the ratio of a firm’s research and development expense to sales.  RnD 
MISS is a dummy variable that equals one when Compustat reports research and development 
as missing and zero otherwise.  CAPEX equals a firm’s capital expenditures to total assets.  
CONNEX is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is socially connected to at least one 
member of the board of directors and zero otherwise.  CONNEX (ratio) equals the ratio of the 
number of outside directors socially connected to the CEO divided by the total number of outside 
directors. 
Variable 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum Median 
Q 7142 1.79 1.12 0.71 8.47 1.42 
CPS 6871 0.40 0.12 0.08 0.75 0.40 
FEC 4475 0.44 0.29 0 0.96 0.467 
E Index 7143 2.97 1.34 0 6.00 3 
SIZE 7142 7.88 1.62 3.97 12.10 7.73 
ROA 7142 0.14 0.11 -0.24 0.54 0.13 
LTD 7142 0.18 0.16 0 0.76 0.16 
CFL 7142 0.01 0.06 -0.21 0.30 0.00 
RnD 7142 0.04 0.09 0 0.78 0 
RnD MISS 7143 0.46 0.50 0 1 0 
CAPEX 7142 0.05 0.05 0 0.29 0.03 
CONNEX 7143 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 
CONNEX 
(ratio) 7143 0.19 0.22 0 0.95 0.11 
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Table II. Distribution of social connections across time 
Distribution of social connections among U.S. firms from 2000-2010. Our sample contains all 
executives and directors in the Boardex database whose companies are covered by the 
Compustat and CRSP databases.  To be included in the final sample announcing firms must also 
have E index data available at Lucian Bebchuk’s Website 
(http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml). 
      
Year 
Total 
Connections 
Proportion 
with zero 
Proportion 
with one 
Proportion 
with two 
Proportion 
with > two 
2000 371 29.7% 22.1% 12.9% 35.3% 
2001 423 30.0% 21.3% 13.0% 35.7% 
2002 527 33.6% 22.2% 8.3% 32.4% 
2003 622 33.0% 24.8% 11.3% 31.0% 
2004 751 35.0% 23.2% 13.7% 28.1% 
2005 772 35.9% 23.8% 13.1% 18.3% 
2006 847 35.9% 22.6% 14.0% 27.5% 
2007 999 40.1% 22.1% 11.7% 25.2% 
2008 958 38.4% 22.0% 14.3% 25.3% 
2009 401 40.4% 21.5% 12.0% 26.2% 
2010 395 43.0% 20.8% 10.9% 25.3% 
Totals 7066 35.91% 22.40% 12.29% 28.21% 
 
 
  
  
Table III: Means, standard deviations of variables and Pearson correlations among variables 
 
Q is a proxy for Tobin’s Q computed as the ratio of market value to book value; CPS is the CEO pay slice computed as the proportion of 
CEO total compensation to the total compensation of the top five executives;  FEC is the fraction of CEO equity compensation to total 
compensation; CONNEX is a dummy variable that equals one if there is the CEO is socially connected to at least one outside director 
according to Boardex data; E_index is the Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011) entrenchment index; Size is the logarithm of total assets; 
ROA is the ratio os operating income before depreciation to total assets; LTD is the ratio of long term debt to total assets; CFL is the ratio of 
the sum of operating, investing and financial cash flows to total assets; RnD is the ratio of research and development to total assets; RnD_miss 
is a dummy variable that equals one when RnD data is missing in Compustat; and Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
 
NAME Mean STD Q CPS FEC CONNEX E SIZE ROA LTD CFL RnD 
RnD 
MISS CAPEX 
Q 1.89 1.18 1            
CPS 0.4 0.12 0.01 1           
FEC 0.44 0.29 0.21 0.4 1          
CONNEX 0.66 0.47 -0.11 0.07 0.02 1         
E Index 2.66 1.28 -0.14 0.1 -0.06 0.1 1        
SIZE 7.86 1.64 -0.29 0.14 0.09 0.32 0.01 1       
ROA 0.14 0.11 0.59 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.17 1      
LTD 0.19 0.16 -0.27 0.08 -0.09 0.09 0.14 0.22 -0.03 1     
CFL 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.11 -0.06 1    
RnD 0.04 0.1 0.41 -0.01 0.22 -0.17 -0.11 -0.28 0.04 -0.21 0.08 1   
RnD MISS 0.45 0.5 -0.41 -0.03 -0.16 0.17 0.03 0.29 -0.16 0.14 -0.08 -0.78 1  
CAPEX 0.05 0.05 0.17 0 0.02 -0.06 0 -0.15 0.46 0.15 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 1 
  
Table IV: Bebchuk et al. (2012) replication and extension 
Pooled cross-sectional and time series regressions of Tobin’s Q on CPS, Equity Comp, Connect Dummy, and a set of control variables.  
Following Bebchuk et al. (2012), we define Tobin’s q as the market value of assets divided by their book value.  The dependent variable 
in Column 1 is industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, which is computed by subtracting the 4-digit SIC industry median Tobin’s q from that of 
the firm.  The other dependent variables are the unadjusted Tobin’s q for each firm.  All independent variables are lagged one period to 
help ameliorate endogeneity concerns.  CPS  is the fraction of the total compensation of a firm’s top five executives paid to  the CEO 
only.  FEC is the fraction of CEO pay in the form of incentive equity compensation.  CONNEX is a dummy variable which equals one 
if the CEO has at least one social connection with at least one board member (not including current employment connections).  E index 
is the number of antitakeover provisions included in the firm’s charter.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  ROA is 
the firm’s return on assets.  LTD is the ratio of the firm’s long-term debt to total assets.  CFL is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow from 
operations, investing and financing to total assets.  RnD is the ratio of the firm’s research and development expenses to total assets.  
RnD MISS is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm’s reported research and development expense is set to missing by 
Compustat.  CAPEX is the ratio of a firm’s capital expenditures to total assets.  All regressions include year and industry fixed effects 
dummy variables.  ***, **, * indicates statistical significance below the one, five and ten percent level. 
     
 SIC Adjusted Q Unadjusted Q Unadjusted Q Unadjusted Q 
     
CPS -0.231*** -0.054   
 (-3.61) (-0.85)   
FEC   0.190***  
   (6.07)  
CONNEX     0.003 
    (0.13) 
E index -0.034*** -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.036*** 
 (-5.79) (-6.98) (-7.03) (-4.42) 
SIZE 0.025*** -0.006 -0.012 -0.010 
 (5.04) (-0.95) (-1.59) (-1.32) 
ROA 4.770*** 5.471*** 5.750*** 5.668*** 
 (61.18) (64.29) (59.19) (49.44) 
LTD -0.281*** -0.357*** -0.334*** -0.441*** 
 (-5.89) (-6.05) (-4.92) (-5.68) 
CFL 0.809*** 0.991*** 1.022*** 0.859*** 
 (6.31) (8.11) (7.16) (5.80) 
RnD 2.631*** 3.573*** 3.747*** 3.061*** 
 (28.15) (30.16) (28.2) (20.04) 
RnD MISS 0.136*** -0.087*** -0.090*** -0.127*** 
 (8.06) (-3.20) (-2.88) (-3.55) 
CAPEX -1.616*** -0.506** -0.873*** -0.102 
 (-10.03) (-2.46) (-3.77) (-0.35) 
Intercept -0.396*** 1.074*** 0.476 2.393*** 
 (-7.17) (10.50) (0.61) (15.26) 
F- statistic 9.3*** 7.0*** 6.45*** 5.76*** 
Adjusted R2  54.1% 56.6% 55.9% 
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Table V: Firm value and interactions among independent variables 
 Pooled cross-sectional and time series regressions of Tobin’s Q on CPS, Equity Comp, Connect Dummy, and a set of control 
variables.  Following Bebchuk et al. (2012), we define Tobin’s q as the market value of assets divided by their book value.  
The dependent variable in Column 1 is industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, which is computed by subtracting the 4-digit SIC industry 
median Tobin’s q from that of the firm.  The other dependent variables are the unadjusted Tobin’s q for each firm.  All 
independent variables are lagged one period to help ameliorate endogeneity concerns.  CPS  is the fraction of the total 
compensation of a firm’s top five executives paid to the CEO only.  FEC is the fraction of CEO pay in the form of incentive 
equity compensation.  CONNEX is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO has at least one social connection with at 
least one board member (not including current employment connections).  E index is the number of antitakeover provisions 
included in the firm’s charter.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  ROA is the firm’s return on assets.  
LTD is the ratio of the firm’s long-term debt to total assets.  CFL is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow from operations, investing 
and financing to total assets.  RnD is the ratio of the firm’s research and development expenses to total assets.  RnD MISS is 
a dummy variable that equals one when a firm’s reported research and development expense is set to missing by Compustat.  
CAPEX is the ratio of a firm’s capital expenditures to total assets.   All regressions include year and industry fixed effects 
dummy variables.  ***, **, * indicates statistical significance below the one, five and ten percent level. 
 
 Unadjusted Q Unadjusted Q Unadjusted Q Unadjusted Q 
CPS -0.269** -0.492*** -0.755*** -1.039*** 
 (-2.35) (-3.95) (-4.31) (-5.74) 
FEC  0.181***  0.192*** 0.433*** 
 (3.57)  (3.78) (5.42) 
CPS x FEC 0.624**  0.596** -0.017 
 (2.08)  (1.99) (-0.04) 
CONNEX  -0.007 -0.019 -0.032 
  (-0.32) (-0.65) (-1.03) 
CPS x CONNEX  0.616*** 0.795*** 1.212*** 
  (3.82) (3.98) (5.40) 
FEC x CONNEX    -0.385*** 
    (-3.99) 
CPS x FEC x CONNEX    1.120* 
    (1.87) 
E index -0.045*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.045*** 
 (-4.04) (-4.18) -4.2 (-4.03) 
SIZE -0.015 -0.006 -0.006 -0.045 
 (-1.37) (-0.76) -0.8 (-0.99) 
ROA 6.387*** 5.595*** 5.595*** 6.345*** 
 (42.03) (48.09) 48.1 (41.77) 
LTD -0.526*** -0.428*** -0.428** -0.537*** 
 (-5.16) (-5.44) -5.4 (-5.28) 
CFL 0.994*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.974*** 
 (5.15) (6.36) 6.4 (5.06) 
RnD 3.194*** 3.058*** 3.058*** 3.157*** 
 (17.30) (19.96) 20.0 (17.12) 
RnD MISS -0.153*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.150*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.19) -3.2 (-3.22) 
CAPEX 0.505 -0.215 -0.215 -0.490 
 (1.30) (-0.72) -0.7 (-1.27) 
Intercept 2.295*** 2.559*** 2.560*** 2.505*** 
 (13.08) (15.82) 15.8 (12.8) 
F- statistic 4.99*** 5.70*** 5.7*** 5.3*** 
Adjusted R2 60.4% 56.2% 60.2% 60.6% 
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Figure 1 
Plot of Tobin’s q as CPS varies from its minimum to maximum, and FEC is either two standard 
deviations above or below its mean (all control variables are set to zero).  
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Figure 2 
Plot of Tobin’s q as CPS varies from its minimum to maximum, and the CONNEX dummy 
variable is either one (With CONNEX) or zero (With no CONNEX) (all control variables are set 
to zero).  
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Figure 3 
Plot of Tobin’s q as CPS varies from its minimum to maximum, the FEC variable varies from 
plus or minus one standard deviation, the CONNEX dummy variable is either one (CONNEX) or 
without (NoCon), and the third-level interaction term is included (all control variables are set to 
zero).  
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